India’s acceptance of the BRICS presidency in 2026 occurs during a period characterised by substantial transformation in global politics. The global economy persists in a state of instability as a consequence of resurgent protectionism, nationalist trade policies, and increasing geopolitical tensions. The tariffs, threats, and unilateral actions undertaken by President Donald Trump have contributed to heightened instability in global market systems. Concurrently, developing economies within the Global South, grappling with debt-related pressures, energy market volatility, and disparities resulting from the post-pandemic context, are advocating for a more equitable global order.
India assumes leadership of the BRICS group within this intricate and challenging environment; the organisation has recently expanded to incorporate Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and, prospectively, Saudi Arabia, marking a notable divergence from its initial five founding members.
The expanded BRICS represents approximately half of the world’s population, 29% of global GDP, and close to 25% of global trade. Beyond its statistical importance, a critical question persists: is this assembly of emerging powers capable of establishing a convincing narrative of economic transformation, institutional restructuring, and universal progress that extends beyond mere rhetoric? India’s leadership offers a chance to cultivate this trajectory, thereby evaluating leadership not only in terms of process but also in terms of purpose.
The future of multilateral cooperation in an increasingly fragmented world is at stake. Over the last decade, the shift toward unilateralism and transactional diplomacy has gradually eroded confidence in multilateral solutions. Significant global institutions founded in the mid-twentieth century, such as the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund, displayed resistance to reform, hampered by structural hierarchies that no longer represent current economic realities.
Given this context, India’s leadership of the BRICS will be viewed as both symbolic and strategic: an attempt to rebuild trust in multilateral engagement, increase the representation of developing economies, and provide an alternative perspective to Western-dominated economic governance, which continues to benefit the Global North disproportionately.
However, India faces a considerable challenge. The re-imposition of elevated tariffs by Washington, reaching up to 50 per cent on Indian products, including punitive actions related to Russian oil imports, demonstrates the increasing weaponisation of foreign policy and trade. Trump’s subsequent assertion that BRICS was “dead,” coupled with his threat to double tariffs if members pursued a shared currency, indicates a more extensive endeavour to restrict alternative platforms of influence. India’s response necessitates a proactive approach.
As noted by analysts such as Prerna Gandhi of the Vivekananda International Foundation, “New Delhi’s strategy must reconcile its immediate economic interests with its enduring strategic objective of preserving autonomy in global affairs”. Consequently, India is likely to abstain from provocative actions, such as assertive de-dollarisation, and instead pursue a refined agenda of encouraging local currency settlements for intra-BRICS trade. This strategy aims to erode dollar dominance gradually, without instigating direct conflict with Washington.
Such duality, characterised by assertiveness alongside pragmatism, is representative of India’s comprehensive foreign policy stance in recent years. New Delhi’s global diplomacy is increasingly based on what may be described as “strategic multi-alignment,” reflecting a disposition to engage various partners across competing blocs, while simultaneously preserving autonomy. The success of this approach during India’s G20 presidency in 2023 offers an informative model.
During this period, India presented itself as the voice of the Global South, prioritising topics such as digital public infrastructure, climate financing, debt relief, and energy security areas in which the requirements of developing economies are connected to global stability. Currently, as BRICS chair, India is tasked with extending this ethos to a more politically varied group, encompassing both democracies and authoritarian states, energy exporters and importers, competitors, and collaborators.
Therefore, the challenge lies in establishing areas of convergence while acknowledging existing contradictions. The expanded membership of BRICS provides enhanced scope, but it also introduces increased complexity. Member states hold differing views on a variety of issues, spanning from the situation in Ukraine to OPEC policies and the regulation of digital technologies. The Indian presidency will necessitate careful diplomatic efforts to ensure that these differences do not undermine the objectives of the organisation.
The initial priority will be institutional, focusing on enhancing coordination mechanisms and ensuring that BRICS’ working groups and ministerial forums transition from declarations to tangible outcomes. The second priority will be strategic, involving the redirection of discussions from ideological stances toward practical collaboration on trade facilitation, supply chain resilience, and development finance.
India’s past performance indicates its preparedness for such leadership. Within the G20 framework, its emphasis on “One Earth, One Family, One Future” effectively integrated philosophical inclusivity with pragmatic agenda-setting. The 2023 Summit’s concentration on global digital transformation and inclusive growth found resonance with developing economies. Translating that accomplishment to BRICS implies orienting a greater proportion of the bloc’s initiatives toward developmental cooperation as opposed to geopolitical alignment.
For example, the New Development Bank (NDB), BRICS’ primary funding institution, should be more robust, more transparent, and more adaptable to the needs of new members. India is positioned to advocate for reforms in lending policy to guarantee that NDB financing gives priority to infrastructure, renewable energy, and digital access projects that directly assist underfunded economies, rather than reinforcing elite-driven priorities.
From a normative standpoint, India’s leadership also occurs during revitalised appeals for institutional change within the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank. These requests have been present within BRICS statements for several years; however, the present historical context emphasises their importance. The governance frameworks of these global entities still exemplify a post-1945 power arrangement, in which voting powers, leadership roles, and decision-making power are still disproportionately held by Western economies.
India’s leadership has the potential to reinvigorate this discussion, clarifying that institutional change is not anti-Western but promotes relevance, an essential factor in guaranteeing that governance systems correspond with the realities of a multipolar global landscape.
India’s focus on multilateral reform is likely to encompass support for “special and differential treatment” in trade agreements, demonstrating concerns that typical global trade regulations disadvantage developing economies. According to Raj Kumar Sharma of NatStrat, “India views this as vital for maintaining equitable globalisation during a resurgence of protectionism”.
The tariff increases implemented by Trump, which affected India along with numerous developing economies, have renewed discussions regarding how trade regulations can reconcile competitiveness with fairness. India may leverage the BRICS platform to advocate for a revised multilateral trading system that protects developmental prospects while fostering accountable global integration.
Energy, food, and climate financing shall constitute the core operational components of India’s agenda. As global supply chains continue to recover from recent disruptions namely, pandemic-related dislocation, price volatility induced by war, and severe weather events, India will probably advocate for policy structures that combine sustainability with cost-effectiveness.
Specifically, regarding climate finance, India’s position has evolved from initial scepticism to active leadership, promoting both increased funding from developed nations and enhanced institutional integrity in the efficient allocation of these funds. The BRICS platform presents a significant structure for advancing this agenda, particularly considering the increasing climate vulnerabilities present throughout Africa and Asia.
However, beyond specific policy recommendations, India must contend with the political considerations of expansion. The recent increase in BRICS member states has amplified discussions regarding membership strategy. While New Delhi has, in theory, supported expansion, it has concurrently maintained the necessity of more explicit admission criteria to maintain both coherence and credibility.
The incorporation of ten or more members, characterised by differing political systems and economic priorities, carries the potential risk of converting BRICS into a broad coalition lacking strategic focus. India’s advocacy for transparent benchmarks, based on consensus and encompassing economic capability, institutional strength, and a commitment to multilateralism, introduces a required level of discipline to this procedure. It also reinforces India’s prioritisation of functional effectiveness as opposed to simple symbolism.
The reported interest of Pakistan in joining the New Development Bank, which is backed by BRICS, in conjunction with its long-term desire for full membership, exemplifies the sensitivities that expansion may engender. Considering Islamabad’s economic instability, coupled with its political volatility, such applications will serve to evaluate the internal dynamics of BRICS, as well as India’s diplomatic astuteness. By foregrounding inclusion based on established rules, as opposed to decisions motivated by political considerations, India has the capacity to strengthen BRICS as a cooperative platform founded on merit, rather than a setting for ideological or regional alignments.
The efficacy of India’s leadership will be evaluated based on its ability to mediate between divergent approaches within the BRICS framework. China, for instance, perceives BRICS as a possible counterforce to Western institutions, frequently presenting it in adversarial terms. Conversely, India is inclined to consider BRICS as complementary, serving as a mechanism to democratise global governance, rather than to dismantle it.
This divergence in interpretation may become apparent during discussions on currency cooperation or technology standards. The defining feature of effective Indian diplomacy will be its aptitude for constructing a narrative wherein BRICS is characterised not by its oppositional stance, but by its enabling capabilities: a pragmatic system connecting development, innovation, and South-South partnership.
Notably, India’s presidency occurs concurrently with the United States’ leadership of the G20, engendering a nuanced diplomatic contest for agenda control. India’s responsibility is to ensure that Global South issues, which include debt vulnerability and just energy transition, are prioritised in both forums.
Instead of allowing the two presidencies to function antagonistically, New Delhi could utilise its standing in both spheres to mediate dialogue between BRICS economies and G20 participants on subjects such as sustainable infrastructure financing and digital public goods. This connective diplomacy would reinforce India’s identity as a convening power, capable of shaping norms instead of merely responding to them.
Against the backdrop of economic fragmentation, India’s presidency holds transformative potential, contingent upon the maintenance of a clear strategic purpose. The objective should be to avoid framing BRICS as a substitute for Western-led mechanisms; rather, it should be presented as a complementary element of global governance that fosters reform and inclusion.
The realisation of this potential necessitates a shift beyond the issuance of communiqués toward the achievement of measurable outcomes, such as increased utilisation of local currencies in trade settlements, expanded capitalisation of the New Development Bank, collaborative initiatives in renewable technologies, and formalised institutional partnerships with other regional forums, including ASEAN and the African Union.
Ending Note
In the final analysis, the success of India’s 2026 presidency will hinge on its capacity to transform moral legitimacy into practical leadership. The aspirations of the Global South have evolved beyond mere appeals for justice; they now encompass the desire for effective systems that produce tangible results. Consequently, New Delhi’s diplomatic balancing act must translate its inclusive rhetoric into concrete multilateral practices: specifically, frameworks that mitigate dependency without fostering isolation, reforms that revitalise rather than dismantle, and partnerships that empower developing economies without reproducing existing hierarchies.
In an era where globalisation is itself subject to contestation, India’s leadership of BRICS transcends a mere procedural function, embodying a philosophical dimension. It signifies an effort to re-establish the concept of cooperation as a mechanism for equity, rather than dominance, and for stability, as opposed to fragmentation.
The extent to which New Delhi can capitalise on this juncture to redefine multilateralism for a multipolar world will be instrumental in shaping not only the continued relevance of BRICS, but also the trajectory of India’s own developing role as a responsible and self-assured global participant.
All the views and opinions expressed are those of the author. Image Credit: 15th BRICS SUMMIT.
About the Author
Harshit Tokas holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU). He completed Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Amity University. He is a columnist for The Viyug.
