The outbreak of war in Iran demonstrates the critical importance of air defence systems, as the country’s leadership was eliminated during the initial strikes and its ability to coordinate defence collapsed within hours. Equally important, the conflict highlights the asymmetric power of drones. Iran used its drone arsenal to strike targets across the Gulf, hitting Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai, while Israel’s Iron Dome continued to show the value of a layered defensive architecture, although it also revealed certain limitations.
It must draw lessons from this war and speed up the adoption of drone and counter drone systems. The central question is whether Taiwan is building these capabilities quickly enough and whether it is developing the right ones. It has tried to close its drone capability gap in recent years. The effort began under former President Tsai Ing-wen, who launched the “Drone National Team” initiative in 2022.
The push continued under President Lai Ching-te, whose administration has set a target of producing 180,000 drone units annually by 2028. In late 2025, the Cabinet approved a comprehensive plan to develop its domestic drone industry, committing NT$44.2 billion in funding through 2030 and establishing a procurement target of 100,000 drones by that timeline.
Even so, these numbers remain limited when compared with the demands of drone intensive warfare. In Ukraine, for instance, about 2.2 million unmanned aerial vehicles of various types were produced in 2024, and production is expected to exceed 4.5 million in 2025. Different theatres of war certainly present different conditions, but these figures illustrate the scale at which drones are consumed in modern conflict. The planned inventory of 100,000 drones could potentially be exhausted within days in a high intensity scenario.
Taiwan, despite its expanding efforts, remains insufficiently prepared for drone intensive warfare and must urgently strengthen its asymmetric capabilities. The war in Iran provides several lessons on how Taiwan should prepare for a potential invasion.
A Promising Path at an Insufficient Pace
Taiwan’s drone procurement strategy currently relies on three tiers. The first consists of larger military drones purchased from the United States. The second involves mid-sized systems developed by state owned enterprises. The third includes smaller dual use drones produced by the private sector. Drones are also included in Taiwan’s Five Trusted Industry Sectors initiative, which aims to create a resilient supply chain. In addition, a comprehensive drone industry development program for 2025 to 2030 was launched in late 2025 to position Taiwan as a democratic hub for a non-red drone supply chain through four strategic initiatives.
Militarily, drone applications are structured around a three layer operational approach consisting of joint operations, tactical use, and combat roles. This framework is intended to strengthen long range reconnaissance, degrade enemy air defence systems, and shorten response times. At the same time, Taiwan has accelerated the development of unmanned surface vessels and underwater vehicles, expanding its asymmetric capabilities beyond the air domain. However, the gap between the requirements of asymmetric warfare and current investment priorities raises serious concerns about Taiwan’s readiness for a potential invasion.
Recent analyses suggest Taiwan should prioritise the “porcupine strategy” instead of large and expensive weapons systems, creating a “hellscape” that would make a Chinese invasion prohibitively costly. This approach would involve swarming People’s Liberation Army forces with drones as they cross the Taiwan Strait and attempt landings on the main island. Implementing this strategy would require a major increase in the acquisition and production of uncrewed systems, a task complicated by international isolation, political deadlock, and supply chains dominated by China.
The supply chain challenge is especially difficult because sourcing alternative components is expensive for both government contractors and private companies. China has also invested heavily in anti-drone systems, while Taiwan remains behind in this area and frequently depends on surface to air missiles that cost significantly more than the drones they intercept. This creates the risk that Taiwan’s stockpiles could be depleted quickly during prolonged attacks.
If the war in Iran highlights the central role that drones could play in Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy, it also raises questions about the proposed T-Dome system.
Testing the Limits of the T-Dome
Announced on October 10, 2025, by President Lai, the T-Dome is intended to adapt Israel’s Iron Dome concept to Taiwan’s security environment. The integrated air and missile defence system is intended to shield Taiwan from PLA’s aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and drones by engaging threats across multiple ranges and altitudes. It would also incorporate artificial intelligence to strengthen threat detection and support faster, more effective decision making.
The T-Dome is intended to address weaknesses in Taiwan’s air defence architecture, including fragmentation, high interception costs, and limited mobility. However, questions remain about how well it fits Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy and the capabilities of its adversary. Unlike the Iron Dome, which mainly counters rocket barrages and has shown declining interception rates against Iranian strikes, Taiwan would face ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drone swarms.
During Iran’s retaliatory strikes, the United Arab Emirates intercepted 541 drones, yet 35 still landed within the country and caused material damage. This demonstrates how even well-funded air defence systems can struggle during saturation attacks. Operating such an integrated system would also require extensive infrastructure and testing, while Taiwan is already under time pressure to strengthen its defences.
Adding to this challenge, the proposed NT$1.25 trillion special defence budget intended to fund the T-Dome remains stalled due to political polarisation. This delay has slowed implementation and raises the risk that the system could arrive too late. While Taiwan must address weaknesses in its air defence architecture in order to protect critical infrastructure, cost effective deterrence measures should remain a central priority.
Vulnerability of Political Leadership
The war in Iran offers a lesson Taiwan cannot afford to overlook. Within hours of the opening strikes on February 28, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior security officials were killed before Tehran could mount a meaningful response. Taiwan should examine this sequence carefully, as any Chinese operation across the Taiwan Strait would likely begin with preparatory strikes targeting radar installations, air defence systems, and communications infrastructure to degrade Taiwan’s military capabilities before any amphibious assault.
Beyond these conventional targets, political leadership could also become a priority. China has conducted exercises that replicate Taiwan’s key government buildings, suggesting that the Presidential Office and other leadership facilities have been closely studied. At the same time, Taiwan faces significant Chinese intelligence penetration, which could further enable such operations.
Initial strikes could therefore be designed not only to weaken military defences but also to disrupt the government’s decision-making capacity. A leadership unable to issue clear orders or coordinate the defence during the opening hours of a conflict would hand the attacker a substantial strategic advantage before the fighting fully unfolds. However, a decapitation strike that is not followed by a successful invasion could ultimately backfire on Beijing by strengthening Taiwanese resolve and galvanising international support for Taiwan.
China is likely watching closely how Israel and the United States attempt to shape events in Iran and whether military pressure can produce a favourable political outcome.
A Shrinking Window for Preparation
Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan still retains a limited window to bridge the gap between its current military capabilities and those it may require in a future conflict, but that window is steadily shrinking. To make effective use of this time, Taipei needs a clearer strategic roadmap outlining the capabilities it must build and the timeline for achieving them. This will require discarding outdated doctrinal thinking and fully embracing a resilient asymmetric defence strategy that leverages Taiwan’s geography, with drones serving as a key component of its deterrence architecture.
Taiwan can also harness the diplomatic and industrial potential of its growing drone sector. In September 2024, it established the Taiwan Excellence Drone Industry Business Opportunities Alliance, which brings together more than 200 drone manufacturers and component suppliers. The initiative aims to accelerate technological development, expand international partnerships, and create a secure supply chain that reduces dependence on Chinese components.
The basic framework for this effort already exists. What Taiwan now needs is urgency. Domestic drone production must expand rapidly to meet the scale of the security challenges it faces. This will require strengthening the local drone ecosystem and ensuring resilient supply chains so that Taiwan can independently produce the systems required both to deter China and to respond effectively in the event of a conflict.
Equally important is the development of cost-effective counter-drone defences. Rather than relying primarily on expensive surface-to-air missile systems, Taiwan should invest more heavily in affordable technologies capable of neutralising large numbers of incoming drones. Domestic companies such as Tron Future and Hutron already provide a solid technological foundation that could enable rapid deployment of such systems to protect critical infrastructure and Taiwan’s outlying islands.
Training must keep pace with procurement. There have been encouraging signs of progress in this area. In February 2026, the Army’s Drone Training Center hosted its first on-site drone licensing examination, while the 58th Artillery Command conducted immersive UAV training using first-person-view goggles to improve navigation, situational awareness, and precision control in complex operational environments.
At the same time, Taiwan should deepen cooperation with Ukraine to exchange lessons on drone warfare, electronic countermeasures, and operational tactics drawn from prolonged high-intensity conflict. Although Ukraine’s drone industry still relies significantly on Chinese components, recent memorandums of understanding between the Taiwan Excellence Drone Industry Business Opportunities Alliance and Iron Cluster, a Ukrainian technology hub, as well as between Taiwan’s Defense Industry Development Association and its Ukrainian counterpart, indicate that practical avenues for collaboration are gradually opening.
The war in Iran has provided a stark demonstration of how quickly a state can be destabilised through coordinated strikes, drone saturation, and leadership decapitation when it is caught unprepared. Taiwan has the advantage of observing these developments from a distance and the opportunity to draw the necessary lessons before facing a similar challenge itself.
All the views and opinions expressed are those of the author. Image Credit: Taiwan Presidential Office.
About the Author
Rishab Rathi holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) and completed a Bachelor’s degree in the same academic field from Delhi University (DU).
